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1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory has proved to be a useful tool in analyzing cost allocation
situations. There is a whole literature dealiag with coat allocation methods that are
based on game theoretic concepts. Examplea include Billera et cl. (1978), who apply
game theory to determine internal billing ratea for long-diatance telephone calls that are
placed through WATS (Wide Area Telecommunication Service) at Cornell Univeraity,
and Straffin and Heaney (1981), who apply game theory to the cost allocation problem
faced by the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930's.b Another well-known spplication
of gáme theory is the uae of the game theoretic aolution concept of the Shapley value to
determine aircraít landing feea. The so-called airport gamea were etudied in Littlechild
and Thompson (1977), Littlechild and Owen (1973), and others.
In thia paper we focua on the determination of aircraft landiag feea. Although the
model of airport games that was atudied in the literature untill now turned out to be
quite valuable, we believe that there is an important aspect in the determination of
aircraft landing fees that is ignored in the model that ia currently uaed, namely the fact
that airplanes are organized in airlines. F~om our point of víew, airplanea ahould not
be considered as isolated units but as a part of an airline and one can imagine thst
larger airlines have more posaibilities to negotiate discounta or other coat advantages
than amaller ones.
In this paper, we propose to use a model and a correaponding solution concept that
give us the possibility to take into account the organizations of airplanes in airlines. The
model and solution concept that we conaider are the model of coalitional gamea with
a priori unions and the extension of the Shapley value to thia richer model that was
introduced by Owen (1977) (the Owen value). Since we want to argue that the Owen
value provides an appropriate method to determine aircraft landing fees, we are intereated
in axiomatic characterizationa of this value. However, the axiomatic characterizations of
this value that already exiat in the literature (see Owen (1977), Hazt and Kurz (1983),
and Winter (1992)) aze only valid when the syetem of unione ia fixed and the coalitional
gamea are variable. But in the context of the determination of aircraft landing feea when
the organization of airplanea into airlines is taken into acwunt, it ia more appealing to
characterize the Owen value in terma of changing syatems of uaions. This becomee even
more appealing when we realize that the importance of the Owen value is partially due to
óFor an overview of applicationa o[ game theory in coet sllocation ~itustions we refer the teadec to
Young ( 1985) and to Tqa and Drieseen (1986).3
the fact that it has revealed to be a useful tool to analyze the procesa of union formation
in coalitional games (see, for instance, the study of a political scenario in Carreras and
Owen (1988)). [n this paper we provide a characterization of the Owen value that ia
valid when the coalitional game is fixed and the syatem of unions ia aubject to changes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the model of airport
games Lhat is currently in the literature and we illustrate thia mode) by the aituation at
Labacolla, the airport of Santiago de Compostela, Spain, during the montha January,
February, and March o[ 1993. [n section 3 we deacribe the model of games with a priori
uniona and we model the airport cost allocation problem aa such a game. We clarify the
modelling process again with the description of the situation at the airport of Labacolla.
Finally, in section 9 we providc an axiomatic characterization of the Owen value that is
appealing in the context of the determination of aircraft landing feea.
2 Airport Games
Several authors have studied the problem of allocating the costs of building and exploiting
an aitport movement areaa írom a game theoretic angle. These coats have a simple but
interesting structure: the cost of building a runway depends esaentially on the „largeat"
aircraft for which the runway is dcwigned, while the cost ofsubsequently using the runway
ís proportional to the number of movements of each type of aircraft. Hence, the coats can
be divided into two parts: the variable costs that are incurred when airplanes arrive at or
leave from the airport, and the fixed costs of constructing the runway. In general, there
is no problem in assigning the variable costs, because they are generated by individual
airplanes. The fixed costs, however, are harder to allocate, because they aze more or leas
independent of movements by individual airplanes. The game theoretic approacó to the
allocation of the fixed costs is as follows: first a coalitional game (N, c) ia defined in which
the individual movements by airplanes are consídered to be the players in the game and
the cost for a group of movements S is deóned as the (fixed) c~ta that would be incurted
when an airport had to be constructed that could accomodate all the movementa in the
set S. These costs will essentially be determined by the "lazgestT airplane that ia in the
set S, because this plane will need the longeat runway.
Suppose there are T types o[ airplanes that uae the runway and let Nr be the (finite)
óThie terminology ia taken from Littlechild and Thompson (1977). They explain: "A movement
ia a take-off or landing. The movement area includes the runways, ta~riwaya, and spron sreaa, ar
distinguished from the terminal area."4
set of movcrnents that are made by airplanes of type t. l~ence, { N~, Nz, ..., NT} is a
partition of the player set N. Let c~ be the cost of constructing a runway that is suitable
for airplanes of type t. Furthermore, we assume (without losa of generality) that the
types are numbered in such a way that types with a higher number generate higher
costs, i.e., c~ G ez G... C cT. Naturally, a runway that accomodates airplanes of a
type t will also accomodate airplanes of a smaller type r G t. Therefore, the costs of
constructing a runway that accomodates all the movements in a set S C N equala the
costs of constructing a runway to accomodate the largest airplane that is repreaented in
the set of movernents S. In [ormula,
c(S)-max {c~~SnN,~O}.
Once the airport game is defined, one can apply game theoretic solution concepta
to find allocations of the costs. A game theoretic allocation rule that turned out to be
especially interesting for this type of problems is the Shapley value, that was introduced
by Shapley (1953) and [urther studied in the context of airport games by Littlechild
and 1'honrpson (1977), Littlechild and Owen (1973), Owen (1982), and others.~ The
cost allocation rule that is defined by the Shapley value was also proposed by the air-
port economists Baker and Associates (1965) and 'I'hompson (1971), who approached
the problern from an economic point of view. '1'he Shapley value was axiomatically
characterized within the context of airport cost allocation problems by I)ubey (1982).
The Shapley value oí the airport game described above asaigns to each movement by
an airplane oï type t the same cost, namely
~i(N,c)-~c,-cT-~~
r-r ~N~,~
where co :- 0 and N~, :- Uk,Nk, the set of all the movements made by planea of
type r or larger planes. This allocation has the following interpretation: the costs of
constructirrg the first part o[ the runway, the cost cr that is incurred by all typea of
airplanes, is divided equally among all the movements at the airport. Then, the coats
of constructing the second part of the runway, the cost c~ - cr that is incurred by all
types of airplanes except for the first type, is divided equally among all the movements
by airplanes of types 2, 3, ..., T. Continuing in this way, the total coat cT is allocated
to all the movements at the airport.
7Also, the nucleolue otsirport games was etudied by eeveral authon. We mention Littkchild (197~),
Littlechild and Owen (1976), and Owen (1982). However, we will tocus on the Shapley value in this
paper.5
To illustrate Lhe problem of airport cost allocation and the application of game theory
to this type oC problems, we conside,r the situation at Labacolla, the airport of Santiago
de Compostcla, Spain, in the first three months of 1993.s In Table 2.1 we ptovide the
types o[ airplanes that use Labacolla, and the number of movements made by these typea
of airplanes. Further, we also give the costs for the types of airplanes and the allocation






CESSNA 1 10 8,120 6.455
LF,ARJET-25 2 6 15,134 12.075
B-757 3 78 32,496 26.054
DC-g 4 464 34,265 27.574
B-737 5 232 39,494 35.044
B-727 6 438 44,850 46.488
DC-10 7 30 50,000 218.150
Table 2.1
Although Lhe approach of cost allocation in airports that is described above (and stud-
ied extensively in several papers) is quite interesting and useful, it ignores one important
aspect of the situations that are described, namely that the movements by aircrafta at
airports are (in general) not individual movements, since the airports in reality have
agreements with airlines. Hence, the movements of airplanes at a certain airport are
grouped according to the airlines they belong to. One can easily imagine that this con-
sideration may have an impact on the allocation oí the coats, since airlines that have a
larger number of movements at a certain airport may have mote opportunities to negoti-
ate discounts on landing fees or other cost advantages than airlines with less movements.
sThe situation that we describe here is taken from Bergantinos et aL (1995) and it is based on the
data that they were able to gather. Although we do not know all the mrnements in the airport, we
believe that the data that we do have are sufïuient to make an example that illuatratee the ideas that
we want to expreas in thia paper. Further, we restrict the acope of our analysis to the montha ]anunry,
February, and March of 1993. In particular, we consider only the depreciation of the runway duting
theae montha. `Ihe coats for certain types of airplanee are computed ueing epecifications for the types
o[ airplanes and data on the coata o( constructing a square meter of a runway. We computed the fces
over a period o[ three montha, but this period can of course be varied. Typically, computing the feee
over a diNerent time span will result in different fees.s
Therefore, we propose to use a model that takes into account the fact that movements
Of alrpli1I1Q5 arc organizid in airlinis.
3 Games with a Priori Unions and Aircraft Land-
ing Fees
The model and solution concept that we propose to use are the model of games with
a priori unions and the extension o[ the Shapley value to these games as defined by
Owen (1977). This value is usually referred to as the Owen value and we will adopt this
terminology. A system of (a priori) unions for a coalitional (coat) game is a partition
of its player set which providcs a prior description of the cooperative structure of the
players. 'I'he Owen value is a cost allocation rule for gamea with a priori unions that
ia based on marginal contributions, just like the Shapley value is. IL first allocates the
total costs among the unions as the Shapley value of the induced game played among
the unions. Further, within each of the unions it r~allocatea the costs that are to be
paid by the union among its members, taking into account their possibilities for joining
other unions. We formally introduce the model of games with a priori unions and the
Owcn valuc in this section.
A game with player set N and a system ot unions P is a triple (N, c, P), where c is the
characteristic function of a(cost) game (N, c) and P-{ Pl, P~, ..., P~ } is a partition of
the player set N into a priori unions. We will denote the set of all such triples (N, c, P)
by U(N) and we will denote by U the clasa of all sets U(N) for any finite N. The Owen
value allocates the total cost among the unions as the Shapley value of the induced game
played among the unions. The game played among the unions is called the quotient game
and it is the game (P,eP) where the characteristic function cP is defined by
~P(P) :- ~ (UP'EPPnJ
for all P C P. This means that the cost of a(sub)set of uniona equals the cost of the
set of all players that belong to either one of these unions. The Shapley value of the
game (P,cP) a.4signs a part of the total cost to each of the unions P". The part of the
cost that is assigned to the union P" has to be paid by the members of this union. The
Owen value allocates the cost assigned to the union among its members again according
to the philosophy of the Shapley value. Hence, the ahare of the cost that each member of
the union Ifa.9 to pay is dete.rmined using marginal costs. For the sake of completenesa,7
the formula t.o cxirnpute the Owcn value for general games with a priori uniona is given
iu thc appcudix.
In the context of airport games, however, the formula oí the Owen value can be
sirnplified. First, we model the airport cost allocation problem as a game with a priori
unions. !n addition to the description of the airport cost allocation problem described
in section 2, we now also take into account the fact that the movements in the set N are
grouped according to the airlinc~s they belong to. Suppoae there are A airlines that use
the airport. 'I'hcn wc have a systcm of a priori unions P-{ Pr,P1, ..., P~ }, where P"
consists of thosc movements in the set N that are made by airplanes of airline a. The
triple ( N, c, P), where N and c are defined as in section 2 and P ia defined as above,
models the airport cost allocation problem as a game with a priori unions. The Owen
value of (N, c, P) assigns to each movement by an airplane of type t and of airGne a the
costa
cr - cr-i
~a,e(N,c,P) - ~ ~ji~,~' ~Nir~ ~
(1)
where ca :- 0, N~, :- Uk,Nk fl P", the set of planes of airline a that are of type r or
of a larger type, and .A~, :- {n E{1,2,...,A} ~ N~, ~ 0}, the set of airlines that do
own airplanes o[ type r or larger types. 1'his allocation has the following interpretation:
the costs of constructing the firat part of the runway, the coat c~ that is incurred by
all types of airplanes, is divided equally among all the airlines and within each airline
the allocated costs are reallocated equally among all the airplanes. Then, the coats of
constructing the second part of the runway, the cost ci - cr that is incurred by all the
types oí airplanes except for the first type, is divided equally among all the airlinea that
own airplanes oí type 2 or larger types and within each airline the allocated costa aze
reallocated equally among all the airplanes oí types 2, 3, . .., T. Continuing in this way,
the total cost cT is allocated to all the movements at the airport.
Note that when the fees are computed according to the Owen value, the total fee paid
by an airline only depends on the types oí airplanes of this airline that make movements
at the airport and not on the number of airplanes of the airline. But for a larger airline
the total fees to be paid can be distributed among more movementa. As a reault, the fce
per movement will be lower for larger airlines. Note that this does not tell us what will
happen when airlines merge. Rather, it compares the specific feea fot different airlinea
'Since the derivation of this Cormula ia eimilar to the derivation of the Shapky value tor airport
games as performed by Littlechild and Owen (1973), we do not include this derivetion in the paper.
The derivation can be obtained from the suthoro upon requeat.8
in an existing situation. It is not possible to make general statements about what will
happen when airlines merge. To analyze such a merger one has to take into account
explicitly the specífic decomposition of the airlines into movementa.
It may seem strange that when the fees are computed according to the Owen value,
the total fee paid by an airlinedoes not change when this airline decides to make more
movements at the airport with airplanes of typea that aze smaller than or as large as the
ones it already uses at the airport. However, one should reali2e that the fees we compute
using the Owen value are only a pazt of the total fees that have to be paid, namely the
part that is meant to cover the fixed costs of constructing and maintaining the airport
movement area. The variable costs that are incuaed whea airplanes arrive at or leave
from the airport constitute another part of the total fees, and this part of the fees causes
the total fee paid by an airline to be higher when it decides to make more movements at
the airport.
We continue the example oí the airport Labacolla that we slarted in section 2. Ta-
ble 3.1 provides a description of the airlinea that use Labacolla and of the grouping of
movements at the airport according to airlines.9
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In Table :3.2 we give the Owen value for each movement at Labacolla, specified by the
type of airplar~e and airline. We conclude from thia table that the fces for movementa
are higher for airlines that use I.abacolla incidentally and that they are advantageous for
airlines that use the airport intensively. When reading Table 3.2 one should remember
that these fees are per movement and that an airline with a lot of movementa can spread
the costs among all these movements. This ia the reason why the fee per movement is
lower. Further, we again remind the reader that these fees only represent the contribution
to the fixed costs of constructing and maintaining the airport movement area and that
there is also a variable cost per movement that has to be paid.
We want to conclude the example by noting that it can be advantageous for airGnes to
cooperate when the fees are computed using the Owen value. The 'Iberia-group' consiata
of the airlines Aerolíneas Argentinas, Aviaco, Binter Canarias, Binter Mediterráneo,
Ladeco, Viasa, Viva, and, of course, Iberia. When the three airlinea of the Iberia-group
that use Labacolla, namely Aviaco, Iberia, and Viasa, act as one airline when negotiating
movement [ees, then the fee for a DC-9 will be 2.180, for a B-727 it will be 14.556, and
for a DC-10 thc fee will be 186.222 (all in thousands of Pesetas and for the Iberia-group).
Hence, the [ee for a DC-9 oí Aviaco decreases drastically, and for a DC-9 of lberia it
increases slightly. The fee for a B-727 of Iberia increasea with about 50 percent, but the
fce for a DC-10 of Viasa is only about half of what it was before. In total, the fees that
are to be paid by airplanes of the Iberia-group decrease from 16749.84 to 12973.708 (in
thousands of Pesetas).
4 A Characterization of the Owen Value
Since we would like to propose to use the model of games with a priori unions to describe
the problem of cost allocation in relation with airpotts and to use the Owen value as
a rule, wc liave to justify the use of the Owen value in this context. However, all
the charac:terizations (i.e., justifications) of the Owen value exiating in game theoretical
litcraturc (scr Owcu (1977), Ilart and Kurz (1983), and Winter (1992)) use axioma that
are only related to the characteriatic function of the conesponding coalitional gamea.
'I'his, in fact, is equivalent to justifying the Owen value for the family of all coalitional
gamea with a fixed system of a priori unions. However, when applying the Owen value in
the context of airport cost allocation, it is more appealing to have a characterization that
can be applied to a situation where the coalitional game is fixed and where the uniona
are possibly subject to changes. In this aection we provide an axiomatic characterization12
of the Owen value in this spirit.
We obse.rve that the Owen value is, in fact, a generalization of the Shapley value.
Namely, we can identify the set of coalitional games (without a system of unions) with
the subset of U that consists of garnes with trivial syatems of unions only. Here, by
a trivial systern of unions we rnean that all the unions contain exactly one player or,
equivalently, that each player forms a union on his or her own. Since the Owen value
of such a game with a t~ivial system of uniona coincides with the Shapley value of the
corresponding coalitional game, the Owen value is a generalization of the Shapley value
Lo garncs with a priori unions. Of course, the Owen valuc is one out of many possible
answers to the question of how to generalize the Shapley value for those situations in
which the system of unions is non-trivial. To capture this idea we introduce the notion
of coalitional Shap(ey value.
Definition 1 A coalitional Shapley value is an allocation rule ~ for games with a priori
unions which assigns to every game with a system of unions (N,c,P) E U(N) C U
an element oj RN in such a way that for all games with a trévia! system of unions ~
coincides with the Shapley value oj the corresponding coalitional game.
In the remainder of this section we will restrict attention to coalitional Shapley values.
One should realize that this is equivalent to restricting attention to allocation rules that
satisfy the properties that characterize the Shapley value (cí. Shapley ( 1953) and Dubey
(1982)). We will introduce two more properties of allocation rules for games with a
priori unions and we will show that the Owen value is the unique coalitional Shapley
value satisfying these two propcrties.
The first property, balanced contributions, is a property that states that if two play-
crs i and j are in the same a priori union, then the loss (or gain) that player i inflicts
on player j when he decides to leave the union is the same as the losa (or gain) inflicted
on player i whcn j Icaves the union. This property re(iects the idea that all players in a
union should profit equally frorn joining the union and that it cannot be the case that
one specific player extracts all the benefits that are generated by the formation of the
union. In the context of airport gamea this means that within an airline the fees should
bc assigned to movements in a way that is fair in the sense that no airplane can demand
a lower [ec under the threat of withdrawing from the airline and acting as an isolated
airplanc at the airport.
Definition 2 An allocation rule ~ on U has óalanced contrióutions ijfor all (N, c, P) EIs
U(N), all I'" E l', and all i, j E P" it holds tha!
~i(wec,P) -~i(N,c,J'-;) - ~;lN,c,P)-~;(N,c,P-i),
where P-; is the system oj unions that results when player i separates from the union
he belongs to, i.e.., P-; :- {Pr, ..,P"-r,P"`{i},P"tr,...,P~,{i}}, and P-~ is defined
analogously.
The second property, the quotient gacne property, is a property that states that the
behavior of an allocation rule is consistent in the sense that the sum of the benefits
assigned t.o thc individual players of a union is equal to the total benefit asaigned to the
union in the game played among the unions (cL section 3). In the context of airport
games this means that for an airline it does not matter whether the airport authorities
compute tlrc foc~s per movement or per airline; a.s long as the authorities use a rule that
has the quotient game property both procedures will result in the sarne total fee íor the
airline.
Definition 3 An allocation rule 1G on U has the quotient game property if jor ail
(N,c, P) E U(N) and all P" E P
~ Wi(N, C, P) -~P' ( P, eP, ~) e
iE!"
where P is the trivial .system oj unions jor the set of players P, i.e., ~:-
{{P~}, {P~},..., {P"}}.
The following theorem states that the balanced contributions property and the quo-
tient game property characterize a unique coalitional Shapley value. The resulting rule
is the Owen value.
Theorem 1 The Owen value is the unique coalitional Shapley value satisfying balanced
contributions and the quotient game property.
T}re proof oí Theorem 1 is included in the appendix. The proof provided in the
appendix is given in the most general way, namely íor the class of all games with a priori
unions. However, the careful reader may note that the proof only requires changing
the unions and that it leaves the characteristic [unction unchanged. Therefore, it is
straightforward that the Owen value is the unique allocation rule for airport games that
is an exte.nsion of the Shapley value satiafying balanced contributions and the quotient
game ptoperty.
We end this section on axiomatic charactetizations oí the Owen value with the follow-
ing remark. (rr the original characterization oí the Owen value by Owen (1977) the Owen14
value wa.v shown to be the unique allocation rule on U satisfying the carrier property,
symmetry in the unions, symmetry in the quotient, and additivity.~o In this characteri-
zation the property 'symmetry in the unions' can be replaced by the property 'balanced
c.ontributions'. We do not include a proof of Lhis statement, but it can be obtained fcom
thc authors upon requcst.
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Appendix
Tlris appendix contairrs the formula to compute the Owen value for general (cost) games
and the proof of Theorem 1.
Let ( N, c, P) bc a garnc with a systern of unions. Then the Owen value of this game ís
given by the following formula. Take i E N and let P" be the (unique) union to which i
belongs, i.e., i E P" E P. Then
ISI!UPa~ - ~s~ -1)!IQI!(IPI - IQI -1)! . M:(Q,S), ~~(N,c,P) :- ~ ~ ~pa~!~p~!
QCP`{P`} SCP'`{i}
where M;(Q, S) denotes the marginal contribution of player i to Q and S given by
(C(UpaEQPa U S U{t)) -C(UpeEQPtr U S)).
'I'his formula is quite complicated (which is the reason why we did not want to put it
in the main text), but it has an interpretation that is quite similar to the interpretation
of the Shapley value. The Owen value of i E P` E P is the average of all marginal
contributions of i in all orderings oi the players that preserve the grouping of the players
into unions. llcrc, an orderiug is said to preserve the unions if two players of the same
union have no player in between them that is not a member of the same union. For a
more extensive explanation of the Owen value we refer the reader to Owen (1977).ls
We continue with the proof of theorem 1.
Proof of theorem 1. (a) Uniqueness: Suppose that there exist two different coali-
tional Shaplcy values tli~ and tli2 satisfying balanced contributions and the quotient game
property. 'fhen, we can (ind a coalitional garne (N,r.) and, for this garne (N,c), a
system of unions P- { Pr,P~, .. , P~ } with a maximal number of unions auch that
t[i'(N,c,P) ~ tG~(N,c,P). Now, taking into account that both tlir and iG~ satisfy the
quotient game property, for all P" E P and all ! E{1,2} it holds that,
~ ~i(N,c,P) - ~ra(P,cP,P),
~EP"
where ~ denotes the trivial system of unions (see definition 3). But then, as ~ir and tli~
are coalitional Shaplcy values,
~ ~G;(N,r', ~') - ~ ~?(N,c,P) - ~P.(P,cP). (2)
~E~,o ~Epo
Hence, if P" E P is such that Pa consists of one player (i.e. P' - {i}), then it must
hold that
tli; (N, c, P) -~?(N, c, P).
Now, take f'" E f' with at lcast two elements and choose i, j E P'. 'Phen, as tlil and ty~
satisfy balanccd contributions,
~i( N, c, P) -~~ (N,c, P) -~i( N, c, P-~)-~~ (N, c, P-~ )
for all l E{1,2}. But then, the maximality of P implies that
~;(N, c, P) -~G; ( N,c, P) -~'(N, c, P) - T~; (N, c, P) -
Thus, we can state that there exists a constant K" such that
~;(N, c, P) -~'(N, c, P) - K"
for all i E P". BuL then, using (`2), it is clear that K" - 0, i.e. Lhat ~; (N, c, P) -
~?(N,c,f') for all i E P". Consequently, it holds that ~(i'(N,c,P) - tV~(N,c,P). This
contradiction proves uniqueness.
(b) Existence: IL is widely known (see, for instance Winter (1992)) that the Owen
value satisfies the quotient game property. Further, it is shown in Vázquez-Brage et al.
(1994) that the Owen value satisfies balanced contributiona. To create a better under-
standing oí the balanced contributions requirement in the context of airport games, weinr.lude a proof of the fact that the Owc,n valuc for airport garncs satisficw this require-
rncnt.
Let ( N, c, I') bc an airport garne and Ict P' E P bc the rnovements of a fixed airline a
and ti and t2 two typcs of airplanes of airlinc a. We have to show that ( with a slight
but non-confusing abuse of notation)
cl~a.c, ( N, c,~') - V~~,c~ ( N, c, ~c, )- rGa.c. ( N, c, ~') - rGa.cz (N, c-, n-c, ). (3)
Without loss of generality we assume that tr C tz. We usc formula ( 1) to find
~,
Cr - C~-1 ~a.r,(N,~, f') - ~ ~,~~,I - IN~,I
t~ C' - Cr-1
ri~n.ei(N,e'.l'-e.) - ~ (~A~~~f I)'(~Ni~~- 1)
ii CT - C'-' ts Cr - Cr-1
~a,cz(N,c, ~'-c~) - ~ (I,Q~,~ f 1)' (~Ni,~ - I) } ,-~r ~A~r~' ~Nir~ ~
Where the last two equalities follow when taking into account that t~ ( respectively tr)
isolates frorn airline P". Now, sirnply substracting gives us equality (3).
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